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Abstract. Evolutionary games are studied where the teaching activity of players can
evolve in time. Initially all players following either the cooperative or defecting strategy
are distributed on a square lattice. The rate of strategy adoption is determined by the
payoff difference and a teaching activity characterizing the donor’s capability to enforce
its strategy on the opponent. Each successful strategy adoption process is accompanied
with an increase in the donor’s teaching activity. By applying an optimum value of
the increment this simple mechanism spontaneously creates relevant inhomogeneities
in the teaching activities that support the maintenance of cooperation for both the
prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Fb
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1. Introduction
Cooperation amongst selfish individuals is an essential underpinning of modern
human societies and wildlife coexistence alike. Revelation of mechanisms supporting
cooperation against the fundamental principles of Darwinian selection is therefore of
key interest within many branches of social and natural sciences [1]. Although verbal
arguments to address the issue abound, the puzzle of how and why individuals overcome
selfishness in order to subdue their actions to the common good presents a formidable
challenge within the scientific community. A common mathematical framework of choice
for addressing the many subtleties of cooperation within groups of selfish individuals is
the evolutionary game theory [2, 3, 4, 5, 6], and in particular the prisoner’s dilemma
as well as the snowdrift game have become widely adopted for this purpose. In both
games the mutual cooperation warrants the highest collective payoff that is equally
shared amongst the players. Mutual cooperation is, however, challenged by the defecting
strategy that promises the defector a higher income at the expenses of a neighboring
cooperator. The crucial difference between these two games is the way in which
defectors are punished if faced one another. In the prisoner’s dilemma game a defector
encountering another defector still earns more than a cooperator facing a defector, whilst
in the snowdrift game the ranking of these two payoffs is reversed. Thus, in the snowdrift
game a cooperator facing a defector receives a higher payoff than a defector playing
with another defector. This seemingly minute difference between both games can have
a rather profound effect on the evolutionary success of the two strategies. Particularly
for the spatial version of both games, it has been reported that while by the prisoner’s
dilemma nearest neighbor interactions generally facilitate cooperation [7] this is often
not the case by the snowdrift game [8]. In contrast, the facilitative effect of the scale-free
topology to promote cooperation prevails in both [9]. Given the difficulties associated
with payoff rankings in experimental and field work [10, 11], the two games certainly
deserve separate attention and have rightfully acquired a central role within the pursue
of cooperation in evolutionary game theory.
The seminal works of Nowak and May [7, 12] spawned many studies and new
approaches aimed towards resolving the dilemma [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18], whereby perhaps
the most direct extension came in the form of evolutionary games on complex networks
[19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30] that were comprehensively reviewed
in [31]. Within latter it has become apparent that heterogeneities amongst players,
especially in the form of scale-free degree distribution warranted by namesake networks
[32, 33], can have strong facilitative effects on the evolution of cooperation [9, 34].
Subsequently, the positive impact of heterogeneity, albeit of a different origin (i.e. not
related to the structure of host networks), has been confirmed also via the introduction
of noise to the payoffs [35, 36], inhomogeneities by strategy adoption probabilities
[37, 38, 39], social diversity [40], as well as bimatrix games [41]. However, besides
offering new ways to sustain cooperation, these mechanisms also pose new puzzles that
need to be addressed; like how do such heterogeneities come about, do they evolve
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and if yes in what way, and what seem to be their most likely origins. Pacheco et.
al. have recently made important steps in this direction by extending the subject of
games on graphs via active or dynamical linking [42, 43], showing that the latter may
help to maintain cooperative behavior, whereas somewhat earlier studies employing
random or intentional rewiring procedures [44, 45, 46, 47] came to similar conclusions.
Moreover, recent studies separately addressing interaction and strategy adoption graphs
[48, 49, 50] also contributed substantially to revealing mechanisms behind the survival
and promotion of cooperation within the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game,
in particularly showing that the separation of the two graphs completely disables the
survival of cooperators if the overlap between them is zero.
Inhomogeneities amongst members of human and animal societies are common.
Indeed, many phrases and titles have been invented to distinguish influential individuals
from those having little impact, and more often than not ‘being influential’ is reserved for
few selected individuals only. Previous studies already highlighted that such differences
between players may beneficially serve common interests [39, 51]. The scope of this
paper is to investigate how such heterogeneities develop by studying the coevolution
of teaching activity (or influence briefly) and strategy within the spatial prisoner’s
dilemma and snowdrift game. In both games the so-called influence of each individual
is the quantity determining heterogeneity of participating players, specifically affecting
the ability of each to enforce its strategy on the opponent, whereby in accordance
with logical reasoning, influential individuals are much more likely to reproduce than
players with low influence. We find that, although initially all players have the
same influence, the employed rule for the evolution of influence quickly results in
a heterogeneous distribution of the latter, which in turn facilitates the evolution of
cooperation in accordance with the established reasoning concerning the impact of
heterogeneities amongst players outlined for example in [9, 40]. Despite the simplicity
of the employed coevolution rule for influence, our model accounts for the often-
observed large segregation in real life based exclusively on the theoretical framework
of evolutionary game theory, and moreover, shows that the resulting exponential
distribution of influence, emerging spontaneously from an initially unpreferential setup,
provides permanent support for the cooperative strategy in the prisoner’s dilemma as
well as the snowdrift game. Our results convey the potentially disturbing message that
large differences in status may arise spontaneously, and although they might evoke
discomfort within the majority that is disprivileged, they are vital for keeping the
population in a cooperative state, especially so if temptations to defect are large.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe
the two employed evolutionary games and the protocol for the coevolution of influence.
Section 3 is devoted to the presentation of results, whereas in the last section we
summarize and discuss their implications.
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2. Game definitions and setup
As already noted, we use the spatial prisoner’s dilemma and snowdrift game for the
purpose of this study. In accordance with common practice, the prisoner’s dilemma is
characterized by the temptation T = b, reward R = 1, and both punishment P as well as
the suckers payoff S equaling 0, whereby 1 < b ≤ 2 ensures a proper payoff ranking. The
snowdrift game, on the other hand, has T = β, R = β− 1
2
, S = β−1 and P = 0, whereby
r = 1
2β−1
remaining within the unit interval ensures that T > R > S > P . To eschew
effects of complex host graph topologies, we employ a regular L×L square lattice with
periodic boundary conditions irrespective of which game applies. Initially, a player on
the site x is designated as a cooperator (sx = C) or defector (D) with equal probability,
and the game is iterated in accordance with the Monte Carlo (MC) simulation procedure
comprising the following elementary steps. First, a randomly selected player x acquires
its payoff Px by playing the game with its four nearest neighbors. Next, one randomly
chosen neighbor, denoted by y, also acquires its payoff Py by playing the game with its
four neighbors. Last, player x tries to enforce its strategy sx on player y in accordance
with the probability
W (sy → sx) = wx
1
1 + exp[(Py − Px)/K]
, (1)
where K denotes the amplitude of noise and wx characterizes the strength of influence
(or teaching activity) of player x. Importantly, wx is also subjected to an evolutionary
process in accordance with the following protocol that applies to both games alike.
Initially, all players are given the minimal influence factor wx = wm ≪ 1, thus assuring
a nonpreferential setup of the game. Note, however, that wm must be positive in order to
avoid frozen states, and hence we use wm = 0.01 throughout this study. Next, every time
player x succeeds in enforcing its strategy on y the influence wx is increased by a constant
positive value ∆w ≪ 1 according to wx → wx+∆w. Finally, the evolution of influence is
stopped for all players as soon as one wx reaches 1. Despite being strikingly simple and
relatively fast to finish (typically around 100 MC steps), the proposed protocol for the
coevolution of influence is remarkably robust, delivering conclusive results with respect
to the final distribution of wx. It is worth emphasizing that the evolution of influence
takes place on a much faster time scale than the simultaneous evolution of the strategy
distribution. Nevertheless, we would like to note that the extremely short evolution time
for wx suffices completely for a robust establishment of the stationary distribution of wx.
We have verified this by employing an alternative evolution protocol by which wx was
allowed to grow also past 1, only that then wx was normalized according to wx →
wx
wmax
(wmax > 1 being the maximal out of all wx at any given instance of the game) to assure
that the teaching activity remained bounded to the unit interval. This alternative rule
for the evolution of influence yields identical results with respect to stationary fractions
of strategies as well as distributions of wx as the halted version used throughout this
study, which directly implies that ‘who gets to run the show’ (i.e. who has the largest
wx assigned) is determined already at the very infancy of the game.
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Figure 1. Promotion of cooperation due to the coevolution of influence via ∆w. Both
panels show the stationary fraction of cooperators ρC in dependence on ∆w, whereby
the optimal value for the latter equals ≈ 0.07 irrespective of which game applies.
Panel (a) shows results for the prisoner’s dilemma (b = 1.05, K = 0.1) and (b) for the
snowdrift (r = 0.6, K = 2) game.
MC results presented below were obtained on populations comprising 400 × 400
to 1600 × 1600 individuals, whereby the stationary fraction of cooperators ρC was
determined within 5 · 105 to 3 · 106 MC steps after sufficiently long transients
were discarded. Moreover, due to the much shorter temporal scale characterizing
the evolution of influence and its resulting highly heterogeneous distribution, final
results were additionally averaged over 30 to 300 independent runs for each set of
parameter values in order to assure accuracy. Noteworthy, due to the resulting
heterogeneous distribution of influence the current coevolutionary model demands
similar computational resources as robust simulations of evolutionary games on scale-
free networks, where several independent runs by the same parameters are also necessary
to take into account the stochastic feature of the host graph topology.
3. Results
In what follows, we will systematically analyze effects of different ∆w, K and payoff
values on the evolution of cooperation within the two employed games. Throughout
this section results for the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game will be shown
and commented in a parallel fashion for the purpose of better comparison options.
We start revealing the properties of the above-introduced model by examining the
impact of evolving influence wx on the stationary fraction of cooperators ρC within the
two employed games. Figure 1 shows results, obtained by a given combination of the
temptation to defect (either b or r) and strategy adoption uncertainty K, separately
for the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game in panels (a) and (b), respectively.
Evidently, ∆w = 0 corresponds to the traditional version of both games where players
are not distinguished, and thus ρC = 0 due to large b and r. For small ∆w the impact on
ρC remains marginal because the resulting heterogeneity amongst players is minute, i.e.
influential players fail to differ relevantly from the disprivileged individuals. However,
as ∆w exceeds a threshold value a remarkable increase of ρC can be observed, thus
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Figure 2. Maintenance of cooperation via solely the spatial structure (open squares),
the introduction of fixed influence heterogeneity (filled squares; see text for details),
and via the evolution of influence by setting ∆w = 0.07 (open circles). Panels (a)
and (b) show results for the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game, respectively.
Evidently, the current model, encompassing the evolution of influence, is most
successful in promoting the cooperative strategy. All curves were obtained by setting
K = 2.
indicating that an optimal distribution of influence warranting the most significant
benefits for cooperators has been established. By further increasing ∆w the cooperation-
facilitative effect again deteriorates, which is due to the too fast stop of the evolution
of influence. In particular, large ∆w (comparable to 1) essentially leave the whole
population in a homogeneous state characterized by wx ≈ wm, whereas the very few
influential players having wx close to 1 simply don’t generate a noticeable impact on
the evolution of the two strategies. Irrespective of payoff rankings differentiating the
two games though, the optimal value for the increment of influence equals ∆w ≈ 0.07,
which we will therefore use also in all subsequent calculations.
To make the initial observations regarding the promotion of cooperation via the
coevolution of influence more precise, we present ρC in dependence on the whole relevant
span of b and r for the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game in Fig. 2. For
comparisons, in addition to showing results obtained with the presently introduced
setup encompassing the coevolution of influence (open circles), results obtained with
the traditional spatial versions of the two games [obtained simply by setting wx = 1 for
all x in Eq. (1); open squares], and by assigning half of the players as having a fixed lower
influence wx = 0.1 (filled squares), are shown as well. Note that the latter setup proved
to be optimal when fixed heterogeneous teaching activities were applied in a previous
study [39]. Indeed, the presently introduced model warrants the best facilitation
of cooperation in both games, clearly improving the performance of solely spatial
interactions and fixed heterogeneity of influence. Nevertheless, while by the prisoner’s
dilemma game the positive effect on cooperation is evident across the whole relevant span
of b, individuals engaging in the snowdrift game profit the most from the coevolution
of influence by smaller r, whereas additional benefits with respect to previous models
deteriorate continuously as r increases. Despite this discrepancy brought about by the
different payoff rankings of the two employed games, the concluding observation is that
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Figure 3. Phase separation lines on the K − b parameter plane for the prisoner’s
dilemma (a) and the snowdrift (b) game. Lines denote the border separating mixed
C+D (below) and pure defector D (above) states. Compared to the other two models
(open and filled squares), the evolution of influence (open circles) facilitates cooperation
increasingly better as K increases. Employed parameter values are identical to those
used in Fig. 2.
the spontaneous coevolution of influence from an initially unpreferential state results in
advantageous environment for cooperation compared to models without coevolutionary
ingredients.
To support the above suggested picture, phase separation lines on the K − b
parameter plane are presented in Fig. 3 for both games. Symbols show results for
the same models as in Fig. 2, whereby below the lines cooperators and defectors
coexist while above a homogeneous defector state always prevails. Notably, these phase
transitions exist irrespective of the magnitude of K as long as the latter is finite. Results
summarized in Fig. 3 evidence that, as the strategy adoption uncertainty K increases,
the evolution of influence is increasingly more successful by promoting cooperation
in comparison to previous approaches. In addition however, it can be observed that
the overall impact of increasing K is exactly opposite by the two employed games;
continuously facilitating cooperation by the prisoner’s dilemma game [open circles in
panel (a)] on one hand, while monotonously deteriorating it by the snowdrift game
[open circles in panel (b)] on the other. Noteworthy, while the impact of different K on
the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game has been studied accurately
already in [52], the complete phase diagram for the snowdrift game has not yet been
presented. The observed difference of impact imposed by increasing K concurs nicely
with previously reported discrepancies attributed to the different payoff rankings of
the two games [8], and moreover, supports the fact that uncertainties may in general
facilitate defection in the snowdrift game [53].
Finally, it remains of interest to examine the resulting distributions of influence
P (w) emerging within the two employed games. Given the fact that substantial
promotion of cooperation was in the past often associated with strongly heterogeneous
states, either in form of the host network [9] or social diversity [40], it is reasonable to
expect that P (w) will exhibit a highly heterogeneous outlay as well. Results presented
in Fig. 4 clearly attest to this expectation as symbols in both panels can be well
Coevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperation 8
 10 -7
 10 -6
 10 -5
 10 -4
 10 -3
 10 -2
 10 -1
 10  0
 0   0.2   0.4   0.6   0.8   1
P(
w
)
w
(a)
 10 -7
 10 -6
 10 -5
 10 -4
 10 -3
 10 -2
 10 -1
 10  0
 0   0.2   0.4   0.6   0.8   1
P(
w
)
w
(b)
Figure 4. Final distributions of influence P (w) in the two studied games obtained
via ∆w = 0.07. Panel (a) shows results for the prisoner’s dilemma (b = 1.05, K = 0.1)
and (b) for the snowdrift (r = 0.6, K = 2) game. Note that in both panels the y axis
has a logarithmic scale, and thus the depicted linear dependence of P (w) indicates an
exponential distribution that emerges irrespectively of which game applies.
approximated with a straight line in a semi-log scale, hence indicating an exponential
distribution of wx. These distributions are rather robust and independent of K or payoff
values. The highly heterogeneous final state is crucial for the fortified facilitative effect
on cooperation outlined in Figs. 2 and 3, in particular since it incubates cooperative
clusters around individuals with high wx. On the contrary, since the positive feedback
of imitating environment is not associated with influential defectors they therefore fail
to survive even if temptations to defect are large. As already noted, a similar behavior
underlies the cooperation-facilitating mechanism reported for the scale-free network
where players with the largest connectivity (presently equivalent to those having wx
close to 1) also act as robust sources of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma and the
snowdrift game [9]. The presently reported spontaneous emergence of the heterogeneous
distribution of influence from an initially unpreferential state within the framework of
evolutionary game theory suggests that even very simple coevolutionary rules might lead
to strong segregations amongst participating players, which are arguably advantageous
for flourishing cooperative states. Noteworthy, the beneficial impact of segregated
players has already been reported in a previous study where, however, this constraint
was artificially postulated [40].
4. Summary
We have studied the coevolution of influence and strategy in the spatial prisoner’s
dilemma and snowdrift game. We show that a highly inhomogeneous distribution
of influence may emerge spontaneously from an initially completely unpreferential
setup, thus providing insights that shed light on possible origins of heterogeneity
within the framework of evolutionary game theory. Given the simplicity of the newly
introduced rule for the coevolution of influence, we believe that the present approach
can be extended further to account also for other forms of heterogeneity that may
be associated with individuals indulging into evolutionary games. Noteworthy, a
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conceptually similar approach has been adopted recently by Garlaschelli et al. [54],
who studied the interplay between topology and dynamics on a model in which the
network was shaped by a dynamical variable of the Bak-Sneppen evolution model, and
there also a highly heterogeneous state could emerge spontaneously above a certain
threshold. An interesting alternative model for studying coevolutionary aspects by social
dilemmas has been presented in [55] as well. Moreover, we reveal that the spontaneously
emerging heterogeneous distribution of influence warrants the most potent promotion
of cooperation in both studied games, which supports the notion that the coevolution
of a secondary quantity affecting the distribution of strategies might yield excessive
benefits for the cooperative trait substantially surpassing those that can be expect from a
manually introduced bi-heterogeneous state or spatiality alone. Resulting heterogeneous
distributions of influence also demonstrate the strongly asymmetric flow of strategy
adaptations between players, which was already observed when the scale-free host
topology was applied [56].
In sum, presented results confirm that the presence of influential leaders is
advantageous for cooperation, and that it may emerge spontaneously even under simple
coevolutionary rules. Hence, the large segregation of individuals observed in many
human and animal societies is vital for the sustainability of cooperation, and it seems
just to ask of the less-fortunate to accept such social states, but of course only so far as
the leaders themselves subdue to the cooperative trait.
Acknowledgments
We thank Gyo¨rgy Szabo´ for valuable discussions and useful comments. The authors
acknowledge support from the Hungarian National Research Fund (grant K-73449) and
the Slovenian Research Agency (grant Z1-9629).
References
[1] Axelrod R 1984 The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books)
[2] Maynard Smith J 1982 Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press)
[3] Hofbauer J and Sigmund K 1988 Evolutionnary Games and Population Dynamics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press)
[4] Weibull J W 1995 Evolutionary Game Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press)
[5] Gintis H 2000 Game Theory Evolving (Princeton: Princeton University Press)
[6] Nowak M A 2006 Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life (Harvard: Harvard
University Press)
[7] Nowak M A and May R M 1992 Nature 359 826
[8] Hauert C and Doebeli M 2004 Nature 428 643
[9] Santos F C and Pacheco J M 2005 Phys. Rev. Lett. 95 098104
[10] Milinski M, Lu¨thi J H, Eggler R and Parker G A 1997 Proc. R. Soc. B 264 831
[11] Turner P E and Chao L 1999 Nature 398 441
[12] Nowak M A and May R M 1992 Int. J. Bifurcat. Chaos 3 35
[13] Huberman B A and Glance N S 1993 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 90 7716
Coevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperation 10
[14] Lindgren K and Nordahl M G 1994 Physica D 75 292
[15] Wedekind C and Milinski M 2000 Science 288 850
[16] Hauert C, De Monte S, Hofbauer J and Sigmund K 2002 Science 296 1129
[17] Kerr B, Riley M A, Feldman M W and Bohannan B J M 2002 Nature 418 171
[18] Jime´nez R, Lugo H, Cuesta J A and Sa´nchez A 2008 J. Theor. Biol. 250 475
[19] Abramson G and Kuperman M 2001 Phys. Rev. E 63 030901(R)
[20] Ebel H and Bornholdt S 2002 Phys. Rev. E 66 056118
[21] Holme P, Trusina A, Kim B J and Minnhagen P 2003 Phys. Rev. E 68 030901
[22] Wu Z-X, Xu X-J, Chen Y and Wang Y-H 2005 Phys. Rev. E 71 037103
[23] Tomassini M, Luthi L and Giacobini M 2005 Phys. Rev. E 73 016132
[24] Vukov J and Szabo´ G 2005 Phys. Rev. E 71 036133
[25] Szabo´ G, Vukov J and Szolnoki A 2006 Phys. Rev. E 73 067103
[26] Wang W-X, Ren J, Chen G and Wang B-H 2006 Phys. Rev. E 74 056113
[27] Poncela J, Go´mes-Garden˜es J, Flor´ıa L M and Moreno Y 2007 New J. Phys. 9 184
[28] Wang W-X, Ren J and Qi F 2007 Phys. Rev. E 75 045101
[29] Rong Z, Li X and Wang X 2007 Phys. Rev. E 76 027101
[30] Chen X and Wang L 2008 Phys. Rev. E 77 017103
[31] Szabo´ G and Fa´th G 2007 Phys. Rep. 446 97
[32] Albert R and Baraba´si A-L 2002 Rev. Mod. Phys. 74 47
[33] Boccaletti S, Latora V, Moreno Y, Chavez M and Hwang D-U 2006 Phys. Rep. 424 175
[34] Santos F C, Rodrigues J F and Pacheco J M 2006 Proc. R. Soc. B 273 51
[35] Perc M 2006 New J. Phys. 8 22
[36] Tanimoto J 2007 Phys. Rev. E 76 041130
[37] Kim B-J, Trusina A, Holme P, Minnhagen P, Chung J S and Choi M Y 2002 Phys. Rev. E 66
021907
[38] Wu Z-X, Xu X-J, Huang Z-G, Wang S-J and Wang Y-H 2006 Phys. Rev. E 74 021107
[39] Szolnoki A and Szabo´ G 2007 Europhys. Lett. 77 30003
[40] Perc M and Szolnoki A 2008 Phys. Rev. E 77 011904
[41] Fort H 2008 Physica A 387 1613
[42] Pacheco J M, Traulsen A and Nowak M A 2006 J. Theor. Biol. 243 43
[43] Pacheco J M, Traulsen A and Nowak M A 2006 Phys. Rev. Lett. 97 258103
[44] Ebel H and Bornholdt S 2002 arXiv:cond-mat/0211666
[45] Zimmermann M G, Egu´ıluz V M and San Miguel M 2004 Phys. Rev. E 69 065102(R)
[46] Zimmermann M G and Egu´ıluz V M 2005 Phys. Rev. E 72 056118
[47] Perc M 2006 New J. Phys. 8 183
[48] Ohtsuki H, Nowak M A and Pacheco J M 2007 Phys. Rev. Lett. 98 108106
[49] Ohtsuki H, Pacheco J M and Nowak M A 2007 J. Theor. Biol. 246 681
[50] Wu Z-X and Wang Y-H 2007 Phys. Rev. E 75 041114
[51] Guan J-Y, Wu Z-X, and Wang Y-H 2007 Phys. Rev. E 76 056101
[52] Szabo´ G, Vukov J and Szolnoki A 2005 Phys. Rev. E 72 047107
[53] Perc M 2007 Int. J. Bifurcat. Chaos 17 4223
[54] Garlaschelli D, Capocci A and Caldarelli G 2007 Nature Physics 3 813
[55] Poncela J, Go´mes-Garden˜es J, Flor´ıa L M, Sa´nchez A and Moreno Y 2008 arXiv:0803.1773v1
[56] Szolnoki A, Perc M, and Danku Z 2008 Physica A 387 2075
